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Cybersecurity

Active Directory security

Active Directory is still the identity backbone for most enterprises, and still the most common route to total compromise. We map the paths an attacker could follow to domain control and show how to cut them.

The problem this service solves

An AD environment accumulates decades of choices: permissions delegated for a project that ended, service accounts with weak passwords that never rotate, certificate templates that allow impersonation, administrators who log in to workstations. Attackers do not need a single exploit. They chain these.

The central question is how many steps separate an ordinary user from Domain Admin. We compute it, validate the steps by hand and show the cheapest way to break the paths.

What is in scope

  • Privileged groups and tiering

    Membership, nested groups, administrator logon patterns and separation of tiers.

  • Delegation and ACLs

    Unconstrained and constrained delegation, resource-based delegation and dangerous object permissions.

  • Kerberos and NTLM

    Kerberoastable and AS-REP roastable accounts, NTLM relay opportunities, SMB and LDAP signing.

  • Active Directory Certificate Services

    Template misconfiguration, enrollment permissions and CA settings.

  • Credentials

    Passwords in Group Policy Preferences, SYSVOL scripts, shared local administrator passwords and LAPS coverage.

  • Trusts and hybrid

    Forest trusts, Entra Connect or cloud sync, and on-premises to cloud privilege paths.

  • Detection

    Whether common AD attacks are logged and alerted.

How the work runs

Collect

Gather AD data.

  1. 1

    Data collection

    Run collectors with standard domain user rights for attack path analysis, and read-only audit queries.

Analyze

Find and verify paths.

  1. 2

    Graph analysis

    Compute shortest paths to privileged objects.

  2. 3

    Validation

    Verify selected paths manually in a controlled way.

  3. 4

    Configuration review

    Check protocol settings, templates and GPOs.

Improve

Cut paths.

  1. 5

    Prioritized fixes

    Choose changes that break many paths at once.

  2. 6

    Detection recommendations

    Event IDs and queries for common AD attacks.

What you receive

  • Executive summary
  • Attack path graphs to privileged objects
  • Findings with remediation steps
  • Tiering and administrative model recommendations
  • AD CS review
  • Detection recommendations
  • Retest

Tooling and technique

Attack paths

  • BloodHound
  • SharpHound/AzureHound

Configuration

  • PingCastle
  • Purple Knight
  • Certipy
  • Locksmith

Protocols

  • NetExec
  • Impacket

Tool categories describe how we work. They are not a claim of vendor partnership or certification.

Standards we map to

Frameworks and references

  • MITRE ATT&CK
  • Microsoft Enterprise Access Model
  • CIS Benchmarks for Windows Server

Mapping findings to a framework is not the same as certification against it.

Before we start

What we need from you

  • A standard domain user account
  • Read-only audit access for configuration review
  • Description of trust relationships and hybrid identity

What this service is not

  • A full migration project
  • Direct changes to production AD

What changes afterwards

  • The number of paths to Domain Admin drops
  • Privileged accounts are separated from daily use
  • AD attacks produce alerts

Questions people ask

Do you need domain admin rights?

No. We start with ordinary domain user permissions, which reflects what an attacker would have after a phishing compromise.

Is BloodHound safe to run?

Collection generates normal LDAP and SMB queries and is generally low-impact. We schedule it and tell your SOC so alerts are expected.

Why do you check Active Directory Certificate Services?

Misconfigured templates can let a low-privilege user obtain a certificate as a privileged account. It is one of the most impactful and least reviewed areas.

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